

DCB1596 Amd 75/2019

Secure Email

Version 2.3

Requirements Specification

Published 9 January 2020

Information and technology
for better health and care

Data Coordination Board

This information standard (DCB1596) has been approved for publication by the Department of Health and Social Care under [section 250 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012](#).

Assurance that this information standard meets the requirements of the Act and is appropriate for the use specified in the specification document has been provided by the Data Coordination Board (DCB), a sub-group of the Digital Delivery Board.

This information standard comprises the following documents:

- Change Specification
- Requirements Specification
- Implementation Guidance.

An Information Standards Notice (DCB1596 Amd 75/2019) has been issued as a notification of use and implementation timescales. Please read this alongside the documents for the standard.

The controlled versions of these documents can be found on the [NHS Digital website](#). Any copies held outside of that area, in whatever format (e.g. paper, email attachment), are considered to have passed out of control and should be checked for currency and validity.

Date of publication: 9 January 2020

Contents

1. Overview	4
1.1 Glossary of Terms	4
1.2 Standard Definitions	7
1.3 Summary	7
1.4 Supporting Documents	9
1.5 Related Standards	9
2. Introduction	10
2.1 Purpose	10
2.2 Customer Need	10
3. H&SC Organisations	10
3.1 Overview	11
3.2 Requirements	11
3.3 Conformance	11
3.4 Information Security	12
3.5 Clinical Safety	12
4. IT Service Providers	12
4.1 Overview	12
4.2 Requirements	12
4.3 Conformance	14
4.4 Information Security	14
4.5 Clinical Safety	15
4.6 Interoperability	15
5 Technical Guidance	15
5.1 Implementation	15
5.2 Information Security	15
5.3 Clinical Safety	15
5.4 Interoperability	15
6 User Guidance	16
6.1 Emailing Patients	16
6.1 Secure Communications	16
6.2 Professional Record-keeping	16
6.3 Data Protection and Freedom of Information	17
6.4 GP Practice Staff	17
Appendix 1 – Example Hazard Log	18
Overview	18
Hazard Log	18

1. Overview

1.1 Glossary of Terms

Term	Acronym	Definition
Address and Pointer DNS Records	A and PTR	An Address (A) Record is a type of DNS record used to control the location of a resource on the Internet. A Pointer (PTR) record resolves an IP address to a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) as an opposite to what A record does. PTR records are also called Reverse DNS records
Communications-Electronics Security Group	CESG	CESG is the UK government's national technical authority for information assurance (IA). It protects the UK by providing policy and assistance on the security of communications and electronic data, in partnership with industry and academia. CESG became part of the NCSC on 3 October 2016.
Data Coordination Board	DCB	Responsible for publishing standards under section 250 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. DCB is a sub-group of the Digital Delivery Board (DDB).
Data Security and Protection Toolkit	DSPT	The Data Security and Protection Toolkit (DSPT) is an online self-assessment tool for data security which allows organisations to assess themselves against Information Governance policies and standards.
Department of Health and Social Care	DHSC	DHSC is the ministerial department of the United Kingdom government responsible for government policy on health and social care matters in England, along with a few elements of the same matters which are not otherwise devolved to the Scottish Government, Welsh Government or Northern Ireland Executive. It oversees the English National Health Service (NHS). The Department is led by the Secretary of State for Health with a Minister of State and four Parliamentary Under-Secretaries of State.
Digital Marketplace		The online platform that all public sector organisations can use to find and buy cloud-based services (e.g. web hosting or site analytics).
Domain Keys Identified Mail	DKIM	DKIM is an authentication mechanism to help protect both email receivers and email senders from forged and phishing email.
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance	DMARC	Is an email authentication protocol.

Term	Acronym	Definition
eDiscovery		Electronic discovery (or e-discovery or eDiscovery) refers to discovery in civil litigation or government investigations which deals with the exchange of information in electronic format.
Enterprise Control	EC	A baseline control set control that applies to an enterprise rather than a specific system.
Health and Social Care organisations	H&SC	Any organisation, whether public, private or 3 rd sector, delivering publicly funded health, public health and adult social care.
Health and Social Care Information Centre	HSCIC	Now known as NHS Digital. The national provider of information, data and IT systems for commissioners, analysts and clinicians in health and social care.
Information Commissioner's Office	ICO	The UK's independent authority set up to uphold information rights in the public interest, promoting openness by public bodies and data privacy for individuals.
Information Security Management System	ISMS	An information security management system (ISMS) is a set of policies concerned with information security management or IT related risks. The idioms arose primarily out of BS 7799. The governing principle behind an ISMS is that an organisation should design, implement and maintain a coherent set of policies, processes and systems to manage risks to its information assets, thus ensuring acceptable levels of information security risk.
International Organisation for Standardization	ISO	Developer of international standards for organisations, for example ISO 27001:2013 Information Security Management Systems.
SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS)	MTA-STS	MTA-STS is a mechanism enabling mail service providers to declare their ability to receive Transport Layer Security (TLS) secure SMTP connections and to specify whether sending email servers should refuse to deliver to email systems that do not offer TLS with a trusted server certificate.
National Information Board	NIB	The role of the National Information Board is to oversee data and technology safely in to work for patients, service users, citizens and the professionals who serve them.
National Cyber Security Centre	NCSC	The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is the UK's authority on cyber security.
NHS Digital		NHS Digital is the preferred name for HSCIC (above). NHS Digital is the national provider of information, data and IT systems for commissioners, analysts and clinicians in health and social care.

Term	Acronym	Definition
NHSmial		NHSmial is our secure email service approved by the Department of Health and Social Care for sharing patient identifiable and sensitive information. NHSmial, messaging, and sharing can be accessed by any Organisation commissioned to deliver NHS healthcare or related activities.
Risk Management and Accreditation Document Set	RMADS	Document set evidencing appropriate management of risks.
Safety Case		A safety case is a document produced by the operator of a facility which: Identifies the hazards and risks. Describes how the risks are controlled. Describes the safety management system in place to ensure the controls are effectively and consistently applied.
Sender Policy Framework	SPF	An SPF record is a type of Domain Name Service (DNS) record that identifies which mail servers are permitted to send email on behalf of the organisation's domain. The purpose of an SPF record is to prevent spammers from sending messages with forged From addresses at an organisation's domain.
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions	S/MIME	A protocol, for sending digitally signed and encrypted messages.
Transport Layer Security	TLS	Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a protocol that ensures privacy between communicating applications and their users on the Internet. When a server and client communicate, TLS ensures that no third party may eavesdrop or tamper with any message. TLS is the successor to the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). For secure email, forced TLS means encrypt and fail if not possible, opportunistic TLS means encrypt if possible, send in the clear if not.
Transport Layer Security Reporting	TLS-RPT	TLS Reporting (or TLS-RPT for short) is a new standard that enables reporting of TLS connectivity problems experienced by applications that send email.
The United Kingdom Accreditation Service	UKAS	Is the sole national accreditation body recognised by the British government to assess the competence of organisations that provide certification, testing, inspection and calibration services.
World Wide Web Consortium	W3C	The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is an international community that develops open standards to ensure the long- term growth of the Web.

1.2 Standard Definitions

The standard uses RFC2119 definitions for MUST, SHOULD and MAY as given below:

Term	Definition
MUST	This word, or the terms "REQUIRED" or "SHALL", means that the definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.
MUST NOT	This phrase, or the phrase "SHALL NOT", means that the definition is an absolute prohibition of the specification.
SHOULD	This word, or the adjective "RECOMMENDED", mean that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a particular item, but the full implications must be understood and carefully weighed before choosing a different course.
SHOULD NOT	This phrase, or the phrase "NOT RECOMMENDED", mean that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances when the particular behaviour is acceptable or even useful, but the full implications should be understood, and the case carefully weighed before implementing any behaviour described with this label.
MAY	This word, or the adjective "OPTIONAL", mean that an item is truly optional. One vendor may choose to include the item because a particular marketplace requires it or because the vendor feels that it enhances the product while another vendor may omit the same item.

This information is licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. To view this licence, visit <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/> or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, TW9 4DU.

1.3 Summary

Standard	
Standard Number	DCB1596
Title	Secure Email
Description	<p>This standard defines the minimum non-functional¹ requirements for a secure email service, covering the storage and transmission of email. This is the basic level for the storage and transmission of patient identifiable data by an email system. It includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The information security of the email service. • Transfer of sensitive information over insecure email. • Access from the Internet or mobile devices. • Exchange of information outside the boundaries of the secure standard. • <p>It excludes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security standards for document archives.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific technical solutions for communicating with insecure email services. <p>Email systems that are not intended to process official and or personal identifiable data.</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical security controls that might be used to make a more secure email system, for example two factor authentication, digital signatures. <p>Note:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Official information must always be managed in accordance with the published HM Government Security Classifications. Personal identifiable data must be managed in accordance with the Department of Health and Social Care's published guidance on NHS Confidentiality Code of Practice.
Applies to	<p>This information standard applies to all H&SC organisations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • public, private and third sector organisations commissioned in delivering publicly funded health, public health and adult social care (Children Social Care falls under the remit of the Department for Education) • commissioned Email service providers (any commissioned supplier providing email services within health and care) • commissioners of health and care within England.

¹ A functional requirement describes what a software system should do, while non-functional requirements place constraints on how the system will do so. This is elaborated at: <http://stackoverflow.com/questions/16475979/what-is-functional-and-non-functionalrequirement>

1.4 Supporting Documents

Ref no	Title	Version
1	Information: To Share Or Not To Share? The Information Governance Review (Caldicott 2)	1
2	The Good Practice Guidelines for GP electronic patient records	4
3	General Medical Council Good Medical Practice	2014
4	Government Open Standards Principles	Update 5 April 2018
5	National Data Guardian for Health and Care: Review of Data Security, Consent and Opt-Outs	June 2016
6	Sharing sensitive information guidance	

1.5 Related Standards

Reference	Title
DCB0086	Data Security and Protection Toolkit
DCB0160	Clinical Risk Management: its Application in the Deployment and Use of Health IT Systems
DCB0129	Clinical Risk Management: its Application in the Manufacture of Health IT Systems
BS ISO/IEC 27001:2013	Information technology -- Security techniques -- Information security management systems -- Requirements
BS ISO/IEC 27002:2013	Information technology. Security techniques. Code of practice for information security controls
Cabinet Office Guidance	https://www.gov.uk/guidance/securing-government-email
RFC5246 and RFC 8446 (TLS)	https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446
RFC7208 (SPF)	https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7208
RFC6377 (DKIM)	https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6377
RFC7489 (DMARC)	https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7489
RFC8640 (TLS-RPT)	https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8460
RFC8461 (MTA-STX)	https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461

Health and Social Care Guidance	NHS and social care data: off-shoring and the use of public cloud services
---------------------------------	--

2. Introduction

2.1 Purpose

This standard establishes the minimum requirements for email systems in health, public health and social care. The intention is not to impose significant requirements on organisations but instead to establish the minimum acceptable level. Where appropriate organisations seeking accreditation to this standard will refer to health and care (DSPT), Government (Mail Check and government accreditation) and international standards (e.g. ISO/IEC 27001:2013 where applicable). In addition to achieving compliance, it is the responsibility of the organisation procuring the email system to understand and accept any risks and issues associated with their email system and commissioned provider.

As well as defining basic requirements for any email service, the standard defines how email systems used for personal and sensitive data (e.g. patient identifiable data) should manage the information security of the email service.

Non-NHS organisations who are currently accredited to the government secure email standard are out of scope for this secure email standard.

2.2 Customer Need

Health and care email is now a rich source of patient/service user information. There is a clear need to ensure that it is held securely and used appropriately. With the increase in cyber-attacks and threats, keeping data secure is critical. The recent Caldicott review [5] on data security highlighted the need for simplified cyber security which is achievable and easy to understand – Paragraph 2.6.4 specifies (our bold text):

“The Review concludes that the organisations facing most risk are those with lower existing capabilities. Therefore, the starting point in addressing cyber security must be simplified as far as possible to encourage full understanding and be achievable within already stretched budgets.”

The Secure Email standard is aligned to [NIB Work Stream 4](#) which reinforces a need to ensure that “citizens” health data is managed securely. The standard ensures that health, public health and adult social care organisations have a recognisable baseline which they can conform to ensuring emails are transmitted securely.

3. H&SC Organisations

Emails sent from and to email systems should be protected by standards to ensure that sensitive and confidential information is kept safe.

Any health and care organisation wishing to use an email service securely and connect it to other secure email services must meet the standard. Any health and care organisation not using a secure email service does so at its own risk and is likely to have other business partners impose burdensome safeguards to ensure their data is protected.

3.1 Overview

The DCB0086 Data Security and Protection Toolkit (DSPT - an already approved information standard) provides the strategic assurance tool for use by all health and care service providers, commissioners, suppliers and business partners. The DSPT has a series of requirements that all H&SC organisations including commissioners and suppliers must comply with. This will include a number of self-declared assertions and mandatory evidence items provided as detailed in the standard.

Organisations should seek guidance from their local Information Governance team on details of the exact requirements

3.2 Requirements

#	Description
Information Security	
1	Either party (Service Provider and customer) MUST notify the other immediately upon becoming aware of any breach of security, including an actual, potential or attempted breach of, or threat to, the security policy and/or the security of the services or the systems used to provide the services.
2	H&SC organisations SHOULD set policies and procedures for the use of secure email using mobile devices and ensure the email service enforces them.
Safety and interoperability	
3	H&SC organisations SHOULD comply with the provisions of DCB0160 Clinical Risk Management: it's Application in the Deployment and Use of Health IT Systems .
4	H&SC organisations MUST set policies and procedures for staff who use the secure email service to ensure that they understand how to use it appropriately and safely, including how to send emails to insecure email systems, such as those used by patients.

3.3 Conformance

H&SC organisations shall self-certify to the standard using the evidence listed below. This can be done by confirming the date that each policy requirement was met (date of issue within the last 6 months) and gaining suitable sign-off of clinical and ICT related residual risks.

If the organisation uses a hosted email service, they must ensure their email provider meets the IT Service Provider section of the standard.

If the organisation runs its own email service, it must comply with the IT Service Provider requirements in section 4 below.

H&SC organisations will be required to submit their evidence to NHS Digital for review, and a conformance statement will be made available to view on the NHS Digital website. This must be reaccredited every year, aligned to the DSPT.

3.4 Information Security

- Evidence of a security risk assessment for the email service.
- A completed DSPT with all assertions and mandatory evidence items filled in.
- An auditable Information Security Management System (ISMS) relevant to the email service that either conforms to ISO/IEC 27001:2013 or the DSPT return.
- Published policies and procedures for the use of secure email using mobile devices.
- Evidence provided by the email service provider that they have met this standard.

3.5 Clinical Safety

- Organisations should have a documented Clinical Risk management process as per DCB0160 [Clinical Risk Management: its Application in the Deployment and Use of Health IT Systems](#).

3.6 Interoperability

- Published policies for the use of email with insecure systems.

4. IT Service Providers

4.1 Overview

Organisations must ensure that they have adequate contractual terms agreed with their Service Providers safeguarding that the commissioned email service meets the needs of health and care, especially when it is used for the transmission of patient identifiable data. Email systems are not normally sector specific (i.e. just for health and care) so IT service providers will normally demonstrate this through adherence to cross-public sector, UK or international standards.

Note that any health and care organisation using an internally run email service is an IT service provider and must comply with this section. In addition to achieving either DSPT completion for H&SC organisations or ISO 27001:2013, it is the responsibility of the organisation procuring the email system to understand and accept any risks and issues associated with their email system and commissioned provider. H&SC organisations running their own email service do not need to obtain ISO 27001:2013 certification as their system compliance is assessed against their DSPT return.

4.2 Requirements

#	Requirement
Information Security	
1	The Service Provider MUST at all times maintain a secure service, even when the service is unavailable to users.

2	<p>Each Service Provider MUST maintain an Information Security Management System (ISMS) that conforms to ISO/IEC 27001:2013, based on ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Information technology - Security techniques - Code of practice for information security controls OR the DSPT in the case of H&SC organisations.</p> <p>ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Conformance should be evidenced by appropriate certification by a United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS¹) accredited certification organisation.</p>
3	<p>The information security controls contained within the scope, on which the Service Provider's ISO/IEC 27001:2013 certification OR DSPT return is based, MUST be relevant to the email service.</p> <p>Conformance SHOULD be evidenced by the applicable Statement of Applicability (SoA) or the DSPT return.</p>
4	<p>The Service Provider MUST maintain an Information Security Policy, as part of its ISMS (conforming to ISO/IEC 27001:2013, ISO/IEC 27002:2013 OR DSPT for H&SC) which sets out the security aims and objectives, as well as security measures to be implemented and maintained. The security policy MUST be regularly reviewed and updated by the Service Provider and MUST be endorsed by the Service Provider's senior management. A copy should be supplied as evidence.</p>
5	<p>Each Service Provider MUST have a suitably scoped independent IT Health Check / penetration test carried out (by a CHECK / Tiger scheme accredited or CREST member organisation) encompassing the email system and any external network interfaces (including perimeter security / access control devices).</p> <p>Conformance SHOULD be evidenced by an ITHC / penetration test report, conducted within the last 12 months, with all identified findings remediated/mitigated, and any residual risks accepted by the Senior Information Risk Owner. All medium or higher risks are expected to be remediated unless there are exceptional reasons not to do so and NHS Digital agree that the residual risk is sufficiently mitigated.</p>
6	<p>The email service MUST provide anti-virus, anti-malware and anti-spam filtering, in addition to commodity content management such as attachment blocking, virus/spam filtering capabilities and data leakage prevention e.g. encrypt protectively marked email destined for the Internet. The service MUST also provide for the management of spoofed email and items that cannot be checked such as S/MIME encrypted, or password protected attachments.</p> <p>The service MUST support DMARC with supporting public DNS entries for SPF set to quarantine with an agreed timeline to implement a blocking policy. All outgoing email MUST be signed with DKIM.</p> <p>The service SHOULD support MTA-STS as well as TLS-RPT.</p> <p>Opportunistic TLS in accordance with National Cyber Security Centre requirements on ciphers and certificates MUST be in place.</p> <p>The commissioner of the email service MUST ensure adequate policies and/or contractual agreements are in place to safeguard this.</p>
7	<p>All OFFICIAL data (particularly patient identifiable and OFFICIAL SENSITIVE) MUST be maintained in accordance with the Information Commissioner's Office data protection guidance paying particular note to Principle 7 and the guidance on the use of cloud computing.</p>

¹ <https://www.ukas.com/search-accredited-organisations/>

8	The Service Provider MUST provide tools to ensure that mobile devices are appropriately secured when accessing the email service. This SHOULD include: Functions to allow/deny/quarantine by device type, organisation or groups of users. Remove device, meets password security, and wipe any data associated with the service. Reporting functions/capabilities. Detect and block rooted (i.e. jail broken) devices.
9	The Service Provider SHOULD provide eDiscovery tools to support the administration of the service, especially with respect to the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Data Protection Act 2018 and Freedom of Information Act 2000.
Safety	
10	The email service MUST comply with the provisions of DCB0129 Clinical Risk Management: it's Application in the Manufacture of Health IT Systems .
Interoperability	
11	Each Service Provider SHOULD comply with the open standards principles .
12	Each service provider MUST enable inbound and outbound TLS version 1.2 or better for secure email transport between other secure email services.
13	TLS Ciphers MUST conform with current NCSC guidance .

4.3 Conformance

Service Provider conformance shall be evidenced through external accreditation or for H&SC organisations, the DSPT. This evidence shall be inspected by the H&SC organisations using the service.

4.4 Information Security

For services using personal or sensitive data, the following is required:

- An independently audited Information Security Management System (ISMS) relevant to the email service. This shall be evidenced by ISO/IEC 27001:2013 certification issued by a United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) accredited organisation. The information security controls contained within the scope, on which the ISO/IEC 27001:2013 certification is based, **MUST** be relevant to the email service.
- H&SC organisations running their own service may supply either ISO/IEC 27001:2013 certification or DSPT completion.
- An ITHC / penetration test report conducted within the last 12 months, with all identified findings remediated / mitigated and any residual risks accepted by the Senior Information Risk Owner. All medium or higher risks are expected to be remediated unless there are exceptional reasons not to do so or in the view of NHS Digital is sufficiently mitigated.
- Validation against the National Cyber Security Centre Mail Check tool to validate DMARC, SPF, and TLS compliance.

4.5 Clinical Safety

- Clinical safety approval for the email service, as per [DCB0129 Clinical Risk Management: it's Application in the Manufacture of Health IT Systems](#).

4.6 Interoperability

Evidence of conformance to the open standards principles. There **MUST** be evidence demonstrating the system implemented supports standard web and email protocols such as https, Internet Message Access Protocol ([IMAP](#)), Post Office Protocol ([POP](#)), Simple Mail Transfer Protocol ([SMTP](#)), Lightweight Directory Access Protocol ([LDAP](#)) to name a few.

5 Technical Guidance

5.1 Implementation

Organisations should assess their current email service against the standard and determine if it conforms or not. If it does not, then follow one of the following options:

- Bring the service up to the required level of conformance. This will normally require the Service Provider to employ an information security specialist to advise on ISO/IEC 27001:2013.
- Procure a service that conforms to the standard. Most cloud email services will conform to ISO/IEC 27001:2013, whilst many consumer (typically free) email services do not. Business grade email services suitable for personal and sensitive data use are available on the Digital Marketplace and other frameworks available from the [Crown Commercial Service](#).

5.2 Information Security

ISO/IEC 27001:2013 or the DSPT sets out the requirements for an Information Security Management System (ISMS). This is a structured means of managing information security risk within an organisation. It is used here as a common basis for information security.

5.3 Clinical Safety

Any IT system used for clinical purposes **MUST** follow the clinical safety information standards. An example hazard log is provided in Appendix 1.

5.4 Interoperability

Systems should conform to open standards for interoperability, normally promulgated by the W3C. Government open standards are published on [data.gov.uk](#).

Systems should populate national directory services. Details of how to populate the NHSmail directory are available from feedback@nhs.net.

Systems can interoperate securely using:

- Government approved secure interoperability standards.
- Secure TLS point to point connections.
- S/MIME or other email encryption.

Note that communication between NHS.uk systems should not be considered secure as the national email relay service is not accredited to the appropriate level of security.

Communication between NHSmail (@nhs.net) and accredited H&SC email services is secure.

Secure systems will necessarily need to communicate with other untrusted email systems, for example when emailing the private sector (e.g. lawyers), other parts of the public sector (e.g. school nurses) or patients. Patient data should never be sent electronically without encryption. Such data being sent to untrusted email services should use the email encryption service offered by their email service. Confidential personal information must only be shared and used in a lawful manner and objections to the disclosure or use of this information must be appropriately respected. There must be a legitimate reason to share the data.

6 User Guidance

This section provides pointers to relevant guidance in support of the standard. H&SC organisations should use this and other published guidance to develop policies and procedures for staff using the secure email service.

6.1 Emailing Patients

The Caldicott 2 review [1] noted the belief that emails should only be used to communicate with patients when consent has been given and risks of email usage are understood and accepted. The review report stated:

“The Review Panel concludes that personal confidential data can be shared with individuals via email when the individual has explicitly consented, and they have been informed of any potential risk.”

H&SC organisations should develop guidelines for health and care professionals to support and encourage the use of email with patients. The [Good Practice Guidelines](#) (paragraph 11.6 Using the Internet for Consulting) for GP electronic patient records describe the use of email for patient consultations.

6.1 Secure Communications

NHS information security guidelines require that patient identifiable or sensitive data is handled appropriately. For routine communication this should be within a secure email service, or sent in a secure manner, for example encrypted attachments that comply with the [NHS encryption requirements](#).

Caldicott 2 established a 7th principle:

“The duty to share information can be as important as the duty to protect patient confidentiality.”

Security and this standard should be an enabler for good quality care. The onus is to provide appropriate systems and so share information, not inhibit it.

6.2 Professional Record-keeping

In the [Good Medical Practice \(2013\)](#), the General Medical Council (GMC) states that

“19. Documents you make (including clinical records) to formally record your work must be clear, accurate and legible. You should make records at the same time as the events you are recording or as soon as possible afterwards.

20. You must keep records that contain personal information about patients, colleagues or others securely, and in line with any data protection requirements.”

Although ephemeral in nature, emails can form part of the clinical record. Good practice is to ensure that emails are copied into the patient's medical record.

6.3 Data Protection and Freedom of Information

Information stored in an email service is subject to data protection and freedom of information requests. All health and care professionals must be aware of this obligation and support such requests.

6.4 GP Practice Staff

The [Good Practice Guidelines for GP](#) electronic patient records describe the use of email in practice, noting that.

“Unless practices have the technical expertise to set up and maintain a local mail server and ensure that it is secure within the practice network boundaries, the recommended approach is to use NHSmail for this purpose. NHSmail is available in Scotland and England.”

Appendix 1 – Example Hazard Log

Overview

The example hazard log has been derived from secure email clinical risk assurance undertaken by NHS Digital. This is not an exhaustive list and should not be used as such. A hazard assessment should be undertaken in accordance with the clinical risk management standards and implementation guidance.

Hazard Log

Email is a communication system. The two biggest areas that could impact care are:

- Information is incorrectly communicated or delayed, for example an email becomes corrupt, meaning that care is compromised.
- Information is not communicated, for example because the service was unavailable, meaning that care is compromised.

Any hazard assessment will require the need for mitigating actions by taking the purpose of email in the context of the business process. Beyond this there are other hazards that derive from these two areas. These are given below.

Area	Hazard Name	Description	Effect
Email	Email notifications fail to arrive	Failure to receive email notification of error message.	The sender does not receive notification of email failure. Potential delay in treatment by way of failure to receive / send email.
Email	Email eDiscovery	Lack of traceability for investigations into incidents where recipients claim one or more emails never arrived.	The email itself is disputed, which may have medico-legal implications in cases where the email is evidence.
Attachment	File attachment issues	File attachments exceed mail system specified limits. File attachments exceed mail system specified attachment quantity limits. Incorrect file formats used when attached to email.	Delay to email transmission. Potential system error resulting from oversize files attachments. Failure to transmit / receive email successfully including potential loss of data. Potential system error resulting from large quantities of file attachments.

Area	Hazard Name	Description	Effect
Attachment	File Attachments - Corrupt file attachments	File attachment contains corrupt data undetected at source.	Inadequate validation on corrupt data files or email content results in loss of data or potential corruption of recipient systems.
Attachment	File Attachments - files contain software virus	File attachment or email content contains virus.	Potential partial or complete system failure. Loss of data at source or recipient systems. Potential loss of service.
IT operations	IT Operations - Inadequate Backup / Archive Process / System	Loss or inadequate backup and / or archiving processes/systems.	Failure to run backup process. Potential loss of service resulting from erroneous recovery points. Lack of recovery position leads to loss of data.
IT operations	IT Operations - Inadequate Failover procedures	Insufficient IT operational procedures covering failover and recovery positions.	System does not failover into a known stable state. Potential loss of service and data resultant.
IT operations	IT Operations - Inadequate Rollback process	Inadequate process / system configuration to allow secure email solution to recover to a known stable system state.	At the point of error, the email system cannot rollback to baseline configuration leading to potential unstable state, loss of service/data.
IT operations	IT Operations - Insufficient Disk Space	Lack of hardware storage used at any point within the secure email system where temporary or permanent data is required.	Email system performance issues due to inefficient storage loads.
IT operations	Document Archive	Chosen mail solution used as a document archive at Local Level.	Potential loss of service and / or data due to inadequate storage facilities.

Area	Hazard Name	Description	Effect
IT operations	IT Operations - Insufficient Security compliance	Security procedures and / or configuration are not fit for purpose of email system proposed usage.	Potential security breaches leading to unauthorised access to personal identifiable data, and commercially sensitive information. System is vulnerable to security attacks variable in nature - causing system failure, loss of data, and other business critical failures.
IT operations	IT Operations - Email Receipt notification fails to arrive	Secure mail system fails to provide receipt during email transmission process.	Failure to receive receipt notifications could lead to resubmissions throughout the email transmission process. This would in turn increase messaging volumes and increase the potential for delays in system performance.
IT operations	IT Operations - Delays in end to end processing of email	Email system and / or performance issues lead to significant delays in transmission at any point within the email pathway to recipient.	Potential loss / delay of service. Potential loss of data.
Deployment	Network Issues on deployment	Deployment of secure email results in network failures / issues at local or national levels, local network, or LAN performance and / or availability issues.	Network availability restrictions result in limited business functionality. Potential issues leading to the mail solution impacting user base day to day system performance and availability.
Deployment	Deployment of email system - Leading to Firewall / Routing issues	Deployment and configuration of firewall / routing infrastructure fails to complete successfully.	Restriction in messaging routing. Complete loss of service due to incorrect configuration of firewalls.

Area	Hazard Name	Description	Effect
Deployment	Anti-Spam filter stops valid emails	<p>The anti-virus anti-spam filter stops valid emails (a false positive) resulting in the email not being delivered. This include:</p> <p>Anti-malware software incorrectly blocks an email or removes an attachment</p> <p>Anti-spam software incorrectly files an incoming email (that is free of malware) in junk mail or spam folder.</p>	<p>The sender does not receive notification of email failure.</p> <p>Potential delay in treatment by way of failure to receive / send email.</p>
Deployment	Deployment of email system - Leading to 'Clash' of Software Tools	Deployment of email system leads to conflicts with existing system software.	Potential performance issues with conflicting systems.
Desktop/Client	Desktop / Client - Badly Configured	Inadequate / poorly configured desktop and client infrastructure.	<p>Inability to standardise and deploy email system.</p> <p>Increased volumes of helpdesk requests on non-standard hardware.</p>
	Desktop / Client - "Old"	<p>Target desktop and client systems are outside the baseline limitations and recommendations for email usage. Note this can include old email services not being compatible with new browsers.</p>	<p>Inability to install email system on unsupported hardware.</p> <p>Inadequate system performance leading to complete system failure.</p> <p>Potential loss of existing business processes.</p>
Desktop/Client	Desktop / Client - Unsuitable Windows versions	Existing operating system is outside the baseline supported configuration.	<p>Inability to install email system on target hardware.</p> <p>Poor configuration leading to operational issues and increased helpdesk calls.</p> <p>Potential inefficient email service levels.</p>

Area	Hazard Name	Description	Effect
Desktop/Client	Desktop / Client – Setup / Migration wrong	Email service setup and migration fails to complete successfully on target system.	Potential performance issues with poorly configured systems. Loss of data due to incorrectly setup storage and archiving facilities.
Desktop/Client	Desktop / Client - Local Connectivity Issues	Local System issues lead to inability to connect to the email service	Potential performance issues leading to complete loss of service.
Desktop/Client	Desktop / Client - Too many windows open	Large number of local desktop sessions exceeds 'normal' expected operational levels.	Email system connectivity issues and performance issues due to increases processing constraints.
Misuse	Misuse - IG / Unauthorised Access	Email system used inappropriately, contravening IG security controls / guides.	Potential breach in IG policies/controls leads to source email information compromise. Breaches in security protocol and local / national policies for mail usage. Potential to misuse system not having appropriate access/training leading to severe email issues.
Misuse	Misuse – Consent	Email system operation by end user who does not have access or approval to use the system.	Potential breaches of information sharing and overall system usage.
Misuse	Misuse – Hacking	Email system is targeted by external or internal hacking or attempts to connect in a manner not permitted by existing IG/security controls.	Inappropriate access to email system data, personal identifiable or business critical information. Critical misuse implications if undetected - complete loss of service, data tampering, etc.
Misuse	Misuse - Internal Fraud	Existing authorised user attempts to fraudulently operate email system	Internal Fraud covers various targets for misuse and may lead to inappropriate email usage, authorisation messages, and potential access to business or personally critical systems.

Area	Hazard Name	Description	Effect
Migration	Data Migration	Errors / poor quality migration of legacy or existing email data.	Data Migration of legacy or email records
Functionality	New Functionality	Additional features of new email system / New functionality introduce issues with current service and / or existing functionality provided.	Potential loss / delay of service. Potential loss of data.
Functionality	Search	Poor search capability results in inability to find relevant email.	User unable to use information.
Training	Inadequate Training	Poor quality training on the new system leads to inappropriate email use.	Potential data loss. Potential inappropriate email usage based on 'not enough' or ineffective training.
Assurance/ Testing	Limited Test Assurance	Test strategy and scope does not fully assure the release of the new system	Potential loss / delay of service. Potential loss of data.
		Inadequate regression test assurance of existing / unchanged functionality.	
		Insufficient testing timeframe.	